Revealed Preferences with Plural Motives: Axiomatic Foundations of Normative Assessments in Non-Utilitarian Welfare Economics by Silva-Leander, S & Seth, S
Soc Choice Welf
DOI 10.1007/s00355-016-1020-x
ORIGINAL PAPER
Revealed preferences with plural motives: axiomatic
foundations of normative assessments in non-utilitarian
welfare economics
Sebastian Silva-Leander1,2 · Suman Seth1,3
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract This paper explores the possibility of defining a non-utilitarian normative
standard for assessments of welfare and deprivation. The paper formalises a key aspect
of Amartya Sen’s critique of the assumption of consistent utility-maximisation in the
revealed preference theory and proposes a generalisation of the standard Samuelsonian
choice model for the case in which choices are based on plural motives (here, self-
interested and moral motives). Based on a set of intuitive assumptions about the way
in which unobservable motives are linked to observable choices, we then construct an
alternative normative ranking rule that can be used in non-utilitarianwelfare economics
to rank social outcomes or provide a normative basis for the construction of composite
indices, for instance.
1 Introduction
Samuelsonian revealed preference theory (Samuelson 1938, 1948) provides the foun-
dation formost contemporary economic analysis, positive and normative. Samuelson’s
theory finds conditions on observed choices that are consistent with individual prefer-
encemaximization. However, recent work in behavioural economics (see, for instance,
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Rubinstein and Salant 2012; Camerer et al. 2005) and evidence from neuroscience
(Harrison 2008) have challenged the notion that individuals maximize a single well-
defined preference in making choices. Sen has criticised the model from a normative
point of view for arbitrarily attaching value to individuals’ actual choices, whatever
those may be, without regard for whether those choices are the product of an informed
rational deliberation process, or whether they have been conditioned by ignorance,
oppressive social structures, adaptation or even addiction (Sen 1977, 1980, 1997,
2004).
This paper seeks to contribute to the growing body of literature in economics
that looks at the possibility and implications of reformulating Samuelson’s revealed
preference theory to respond to the above mentioned criticism (see, for instance,
Kalai et al. 2002; Green and Hojman 2007). The model operates at two levels.
First, choices are made at the individual level through an internal decision-making
mechanism based on underlying (unobservable) preference orderings, called motives.
Individual choices are then combined into a social or collective choice through
a collective (observable) decision making mechanism. Following Chambers and
Hayashi (2012), we will adopt the viewpoint of an external scientific observer or
economist, who attempts to impute underlying binary preference relations (motives)
from observed individual or collective choices over pairs of goods using a standard
Bayesian approach (see also Noor 2011, 2013). Advances in neurosciences may one
day enable us to obtain direct evidence on motivational sources (see, for instance,
Bernheim and Rangel 2009). However, this paper will be concerned with the ques-
tion of how to assign normative value to observed choices in the absence of such
evidence. The main result of the paper, captured in Proposition 2, is to show that
it is possible to generate a normative ranking of social outcomes that is based on
a non-utilitarian description of human nature and thus on a non-standard theory of
choice.
The specific normative stance adopted in this paper follows Sen in considering
that some motivations are more “legitimate” than others (e.g. rational deliberation
vs. addiction), making it normatively relevant to aquire information, not only about
observed choices, but also about underlying motives.1 The proposed model is non-
standard in that non-utilitarian motives are taken into account, but the methodology
we adopt for analysing those preferences is standard in that the observable is a choice
correspondence, or collection of choice correspondences.
In Sect. 2, we will introduce the notation and explain the overall structure of the
model. In Sect. 3, we present the model and introduce the axioms that will be used to
derive the results. The standard (Samuelsonian)model is nested in ourmodel, whenwe
exclude reasoned or moral motives. In Sect. 4, we present our main results. Section 5
concludes.
1 In so doing we thus depart from the interpretation of the revealed preference theory as a methodological
statement (Gul and Pesendorfer 2005) and as a mere formalisation of the concept of preference as choice
(Debreu 1954). For a critique of this interpretation and a justification of the chosen approach, we refer the
reader to the writings of Sen (1977), Hirschman (1984) and Etzioni (1986).
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2 Structure and notation
The model works backwards from an external observer making inferences about the
underlyingmotives that have led individuals or groups of individuals to choose particu-
lar options. The external observer thenmakes a normative rankingof the chosenoptions
based on his/her positive assessment of the likely motives underpinning observed
choices.
The notation used in this paper will be complicated by the fact that we use different
symbols to describe the same object, depending on whether we are describing it from
the point of view of the chooser or from the point of view of the external observer.
This is deemed necessary to keep a clear distinction between normative, descriptive
and inferencial statements.
Furthermore, the model comprises two levels of choice, namely an individual level
and a collective level, where individual choices are combined into social choices. Here,
we will use different subscripts to distinguish these different levels, namely lower case
subscripts for individual choices, and upper case subscripts for collective choices.
2.1 Chooser
Let N be the set of all possible individuals and let X be the finite set of all possible
options. We denote any non-empty subset of X by S and the set of all such non-empty
subsets by K . If S is the set of options available to an individual i ∈ N , then let
ci (S) ⊆ S denote the choice set of i or the set of chosen options from S by i . For
example, suppose S = {x, y} for any x, y ∈ X and ci (S) = {x}. This means that
individual i has chosen option x from the available options x and y. Thus, ci (S) is the
observable primitive of the model. In this paper, we treat S as a variable within K as
in Sen (1971).
The observable choice set ci (S) has been generated from unobservable motives,
R·i , through an internal decision making mechanism that is described below. Our
model however does not impose any functional form that represents these motives.
The decision maker i’s motives are represented by a complete, transitive, and reflexive
binary relation over any pairs of options, x, y ∈ X , where x R·i y should be interpreted
asmeaning that “x is at least as good as y according to themotive R·i .” The asymmetric
and symmetric elements of R·i will be designated, respectively, by P ·i and I ·i . For the
moment, we are not making any assumptions about how R·i relates to ci (S), and are
simply defining R·i as a description of an individual’s mental ranking of available
options, prior to making the choice.
At the collective level, a social choice may be obtained by combining individual
choices through a collective decision-making mechanism. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that each individual in N has only one choice set, ci (S), generated from
exactly two motives, RUi and R
M
i , which will be described below. Our approach in
this paper however could easily be generalised to more than two motives. Let I ⊆ N
be any non-empty subset (group) of individuals. Note that we allow a group to consist
of only one individual. Let us denote the set of all such subsets of individuals by Q.
For any I ∈ Q that has reached consensus on a particular collective decision, we
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denote the collective choice set corresponding to that group simply as the intersection
of individual observable choice sets: cI(S) ≡ ∩i∈Ici (S), where the number of people
reaching consensus to a collective decision within group I is denoted by its cardinality
|I|. We assume cI(S) is non-empty.
Suppose the collective choice of group L ∈ Q prevails as the social choice, which,
in our framework, is treated as a concensus decision. We do not need to make any
assumption about the way in which any consensus is reached, other than the fact
that each individual i ∈ L has equal influence over the consensus decision. Our
formulation can thus accommodate all possible decision makingmechanisms, ranging
from absolute dictatorship when the decisive group consists of only one individual,
to unanimity rule when the consensus size is equal to the number of individuals in the
population, to absolute majority rule when the concensus size is more than half of the
number of individuals in the population.
For our purpose in the paper, we will make a distinction between two fundamental
types of motives described by Harsanyi (1955) and Sen (1977). One is subjective, self-
centred or idiosyncratic motives and the other is ethical, moral or reasoned motives.
The idiosyncratic motives are defined as yielding a private preference ordering RUi
∀i ∈ N , such that there exists i, j ∈ N , i = j , such that RUi = RUj . Thus, idiosyncratic
motives are defined by the fact that there exists at least two individuals for which the
motives diverge. The reasoned motives, on the other hand, are defined as a singleton
RMI for any group I ⊆ N such that RMi = RMI ∀i ∈ I. Reasoned motives are defined
by the fact that they concord (i.e. are identical) across individuals within a group.
Reasoned motives refer to the capacity of individual members of a group to recognise
that there is a common group interest that transcends their individual interests.2 Note
that each individual assesses options according to both motives, and the order of his
or her assessments does not affect the individual’s decision outcome. Moreover, these
motives are assumed to be fixed and independent across individuals, which is reflected
by a property that we refer to as independence in Sect. 3.1.
2.2 External observer
Because R·i ’s here represent mental states or motives, rather than actual choices, they
are never directly observed, and will have to be inferred by the external observer
from the outcome of a choice process. The external observer does this by applying a
standard Bayesian deductive logic to available information, where observed choices
are considered as the outcome of a stochastic process generated by unobservable events
(underlying motives), which have a given probability of occurring. From the point of
2 The specific form of rationality invoked under RMI can be thought of as a weak form of Kantian “pure
reason”. Formally, Kant defines pure reason as the “faculty of the unity of the rules of understanding under
principles” (Kant 1781, p. A302/B359), that is the capacity for abstraction or universalisation. Judgment,
then is the capacity “of thinking the particular as contained under the universal” (Kant 1790, p. 5:179), that
is to link a particular situation to a universal rule. In our model, RMI will coincide with a universal rule only
in the specific case where I = N (see Proposition 1 below). Note that this definition of rationality does not
require individuals to agree on all moral issues, since (a) RMI may only cover a small subset of options, and
(b) final choices may be influenced also by idiosyncratic motives.
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view of the external observer who is making tentative inferences about unobservable
phenomena, the underlying motives will thus be thought of as events.
For the simplicity of exposition, from this point forward we consider only a fixed
pair of options x ,y ∈ X such that x = y and introduce some additional notation. We
use the notation  ·i = {ψ ·i ;χ ·i } to designate the set of possible events for chooser i
over the pair of options x, y ∈ X , where ψ ·i = yP ·i x and χ ·i = x P ·i y.3 As usual, P ·i
can be decomposed into weak preference relations, such that ψ ·i ≡ yR·i x & ¬x R·i y
and χ ·i ≡ x R·i y & ¬yR·i x . Note that the external observer does not observe  ·i or its
elements as this decision making process is internal to chooser i .
The set of possible observable outcomes associated with  ·i is written as i =
{ω∅i ;ωxi ;ωyi }, where the elements in the set are defined as follows for the pair x, y ∈ X
and for any i ∈ N :
• ω∅i ≡ x, y /∈ ci (S) and x, y ∈ S (i.e. i chooses neither x nor y when both are
available).
• ωxi ≡ x ∈ ci (S) and y ∈ S\ci (S) (i.e. i chooses only x when both x and y are
available).
• ωyi ≡ y ∈ ci (S) and x ∈ S\ci (S) (i.e. i chooses only y when both x and y are
available).
The role of the external observer will be to attempt to estimate the conditional
probability p( ·i | i ), given the external observer’s assumptions about the decision
making process linking unobservable events  ·i to observable outcomes i .
As in the previous subsection, the subscript I will be used to describe the compo-
nents pertaining to any group I ∈ Q. Thus, χUI , for instance, describes the unobserved
event that x PUi y occurs simultaneously for all i ∈ I, i.e., χUI ≡ ∩i∈IχUi . In other
words, it describes a case in which there is a concordance of interests within the group
I. Similar group notation applies to other elements in the set of possible events.
Similarly, ωxI denotes the observable collective choice outcome corresponding to
the consensus set cI (S), generated by the collective decision making mechanism
of group I, whereby group I collectively chooses x over y, when y is available, i.e.,
ωxI ≡ ∩i∈Iωxi . Similar group notation applies to other elements in the set of observable
outcomes. The set of all possible finite collective decision-making outcomes observed
by the external observer, ω·I , reached by all I ∈ Q is denoted by Z (this includes
individual choice outcomes), which is the domain of the ranking of social outcomes.
The end goal is to obtain a normative assessment of social outcomes. To this end,
the external observer has to assign normative value to his inferred beliefs regarding
the motives of the chooser(s). From this point of view, the outcomes of the choice
process will be thought of as social states. Here, we will use the notation  to mean
that a given social state “is at least as good as”. Hence, ωxI  ω
y
I indicates that social
state x of group I is preferrable from a normative point of view to social state y of
group I. Note that  has a symmetric and asymmetric element, denoted by ∼ and
	, respectively. The normative ranking of social states described by  should not be
3 For simplicity, we leave out the case of indifference between options. In this paper, we are mainly
concerned with collective choices typically taking the form of an exclusive choice between two or more
options, for instance, in an election.
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confused with the positive description of individuals’ actual preferences over those
states, noted RUi and R
M
i .
Note that  is only transitive on Z and cannot necessarily be reduced to a transitive
ranking on outcomes because it takes both the outcome and the group of individuals
who comprise consensus on that outcome as inputs. For example, if groups I,J ∈ Q
both agree on the public provision of health care, we could haveωxI 	 ωxJ if |I| > |J |,
which simply means that the normative force of group I’s preference for health care
is greater than that of group J ’s preferences for health care.
3 Model
In order to draw inferences about unobservable motives from observable choices, the
external observer defines a system of conditional probabilities, p (·), which defines
the set of possible outcomes that can be generated by a given combinations of events
(motives). These constitute the observer’s beliefs about the way in which motives gen-
erate observed choices. For tractability, we will impose some regularity assumptions
(or rules for inference) on the set of conditional probabilities.
3.1 Linking motives to social outcomes
In the presence of dual preferences, the decision-making processwill need to consist of
at least three separate stages. In the first two stages, the options are assessed separately
according to the two motives, RUi and R
M
i . The specific order of the idiosyncratic and
reasoned assessments does not influence the results of this paper. What matters is that
two separate and independent assessments are carried out before the final choice is
made, which is stage three.
Given that the external observer can only see the final choices made but not the
underlying motives that have led to the observed choice, the observer needs to impose
a set of plausible assumptions, which we refer to as properties, about the decision-
making process linking underlying preferences to choice. The properties will be stated
as a system of conditional probabilities characterising the decision-making process
from the point of view of the external observer.
Anonymity (ANO) For all i, j ∈ N such that i = j and for x, y ∈ X , p(χUi | ωxi ) =
p(χUj | ωxj ) and p(ψUi | ωyi ) = p(ψUj | ωyj ).
The first property (ANO) captures the external observer’s assumption that the
probability that a given act is motivated by idiosyncratic motives is equal across all
individuals.
Independence (IND) For any I ∈ Q such that |I| > 1 and for x, y ∈ X , p(χUI |
ωxI) =
∏
i∈I p(χUi | ωxi ) and p(ψUI | ωyI) =
∏
i∈I p(ψUi | ωyi ).
According the second property (IND), the external observer assumes that idiosyn-
cratic motives of individuals are jointly independent within any subgroup of size
greater than or equal to 2. In other words, the external observer assumes that individ-
ual i’s preference for, say, x over y is not influenced bywhether other individualswithin
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the same group prefer x over y. This does not necessarily imply that the chooser’s
idiosyncratic motives must be independent of others’ idiosyncratic motives, but sim-
ply that the external observer does not have any information on whether and how such
relations exist. Inferring dependence in individual motives by the external observer
will require further assumptions that we do not consider in this paper.
Completeness (COM) For any I ∈ Q and for x, y ∈ X , p(χUI ∪χMI | ω·I)+ p(ψUI ∪
ψMI | ω·I) = 1.
The third property (COM) states that a given observed act, ω·I , must have been
motivated either by χUI ∪ χMI or by ψUI ∪ ψMI . Note that ω·I may represent either ωxi
or ωyi or ω
∅
i .
Coherence (COH) For any I ∈ Q and for x, y ∈ X , p(ψ ·I | ωxI) = 0 and p(χ ·I |
ω
y
I) = 0.
This fourth property (COH) states that if a group I (which may consist of a single
individual) is observed to have chosen x over y, then the external observer infers that
I could not have strongly preferred y over x , neither under idiosyncratic motives nor
under moral motives. Similar statement applies when y is observed to be chosen over
x . This is a Pareto axiom, stating that if preferences go in one direction, choice cannot
go in the other direction.4
Uncertainty (UNC) For any I, J ∈ Q\{N } and for x, y ∈ X , p(χUI ∩ χMI | ωxI) =
p(χUJ ∩ χMJ | ωxJ ) and p(ψUI ∩ ψMI | ωyI) = p(ψUJ ∩ ψMJ | ωyJ ).
The final property (UNC) states that when the external observer observes that a
group has chosen, say, x over y, and it is possible for all idiosyncratic motives within
that group to concord, the external observer acknowledges that there is a possibility of
the decision being reached by a combination of both idiosyncratic and moral motives.
However, in the absence of any information about the underlying decision making
mechanisms, he assumes that the overlap between idiosyncratic and moral motives is
the same across groups.5 This property is only used to obtain the result in Corollary 1.
The five properties impose natural restrictions on beliefs based on observed choices,
which will help the external observer to draw inference on unobservable motives from
observed choice outcomes. In order to assign normative value to these choices, we
must introduce an additional axiom that links the positive inference to a normative
rule. If, like Sen (1977), we consider that value stems from reason rather than from
other preferences, it is logical to make the normative value of a given choice directly
proportional on the probability that it is caused by RMi and inversely proportional to
the probability that it is caused by RUi . We do this by using the following normative
4 Note that in the single preference case, property COH reduces to p(ψUi | ωxi ) = 0, which could arguably
be considered as a formal representation of Sen’s (1971, 1977) interpretation of the Axiom of Revealed
Preference (ARP) as a normative inference claim (“revelation”) about underlying utility-maximising pref-
erences (i.e. “if we observe that i chooses x over y, when y is available, then we can infer that i did not
prefer y to x under the relation RUi ”). This should be contrasted against the usual interpretation of the ARP
as a descriptive equivalence claim (i.e. “if i chooses x over y, when y is available, we say that i does not
prefer y to x under the relation R·i ”).
5 One may extend this simplified property by assuming a distribution of the probabilities of overlap.
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axiom, called Probability-Based Rankings, which states that the external observer
(1) normatively prefers the social outcome that is less likely to have been caused
by idiosyncratic motives (i.e. a convergence of self-interests), and (2) is normatively
indifferent between two social states that have equal probability of having been caused
by idiosyncratic motives. In other words, from the perspective of the external observer,
a greater concordance of choices made under idiosyncratic motives would not carry
more normative strength, as such concordance would be merely coincidental, and
could be reversed if the external interests leading to the choice were to change.
Probability-Based Rankings (PBR) For x, y ∈ X and for any I,J ∈ Q and
ωxI , ω
x
J ∈ Z ,
ωxI 	 ωxJ ⇔ p(χUI | ωxI) < p(χUJ | ωxJ ) (1a)
ωxI ∼ ωxJ ⇔ p(χUI | ωxI) = p(χUJ | ωxJ ). (1b)
4 Results
In this section, we present our results in the form of Lemma 1, Propositions 1 and 2.
4.1 Inference from collective choices
The first result is captured in Lemma 1, which states that the probability that a group’s
choice is based on idiosyncratic motives is lower than for any of its proper subsets. The
intuition behind Lemma 1 is that the more thorough the vetting process (i.e. the more
individuals who have to consent to a decision), the less likely it is that the collective
choice outcome will result from a mere coincidence of self-interests.
Lemma 1 For all I, A ∈ Q\{N } and for x, y ∈ X, we can use properties ANO and
IND to infer that: A ⊂ I ⇒ p(χUI | ωxI) ≤ p(χUA | ωxA).
Proof Let I, A ∈ Q\ {N } be two non-empty groups of individuals, such that A ⊂ I.
It then follows that 0 < |A| < |I|.
By property ANO, we already know that for all i, j ∈ N such that i = j ,
p(χUi | ωxi ) = p(χUj | ωxj ). (2)
By property IND along with Eq. (2), we get
p(χUI | ωxI) = (p(χUi | ωxi ))|I|, (3)
and
p(χUA | ωxA) = (p(χUi | ωxi ))|A|. (4)
Given that |A| < |I|, then comparing Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain p(χUI | ωxI) ≤
p(χUA | ωxA). unionsq
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Lemma 1 has an intuitive corollary that may be obtained by using the UNC property
along with properties COM and COH.
Corollary 1 For all I, A ∈ Q\ {N } and for x, y ∈ X, we can use properties ANO,
IND, COM, COH, and UNC to infer that: A ⊂ I ⇒ p(χMI | ωxI) ≥ p(χMA | ωxA).
Proof We already know from Lemma 1 that by properties ANO and IND,
p(χUI | ωxI) ≤ p(χUA | ωxA). (5)
Then, by property COH, we know that for any I ∈ Q and for x , y ∈ X , p(ψUI |
ωxI) = 0 and p(ψMI | ωxI) = 0 and thus, p(ψUI ∪ ψMI | ωxI) = 0. Combined with
property COM leads to, for any I ∈ Q and for x , y ∈ X :
p(χUI ∪ χMI | ωxI) = 1. (6)
It then follows that,
p(χUI ∪ χMI | ωxI) = p(χUA ∪ χMA | ωxA). (7)
Expanding both sides of Eq. (7), we obtain,
p(χUI | ωxI) + p(χMI | ωxI) − p(χUI ∩ χMI | ωxI) = p(χUA | ωxA) + p(χMA | ωxA)
− p(χUA ∩ χMA | ωxA). (8)
Finally, by property UNC, we know that
p(χUI ∩ χMI | ωxI) = p(χUA ∩ χMA | ωxA). (9)
Hence, by combining Eqs. (5), (8) and (9), we obtain p(χMI | ωxI) ≥ p(χMA | ωxA).unionsq
Under the external observer’s assumption, stated in property UNC, Corollary 1
intuitively states that more thorough the vetting process, the more likely it is that the
collective choice outcome will result from moral motives.
The following proposition follows from the definition of idiosyncratic and reasoned
motives. Indeed, in the limit, as I tends to N , we can think of a hypothetical consensus
involving all possible individuals in N with all possible combinations of motives.
Proposition 1 For x, y ∈ X, ifI = N , thenwe can use the definitions of idiosyncratic
and reasonedmotives alongwith properties COMandCOH to infer that: p(χUI ∪χMI |
ωxI) = p(χMI | ωxI) = 1.
Proof By the general property of additivity of probabilities, we have:
p(χUI ∪ χMI | ωxI) = p(χUI | ωxI) + p(χMI | ωxI) − p(χUI ∩ χMI | ωxI). (10)
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By the construction of χUI , we can re-write Eq. (10) as:
p(χUI ∪χMI | ωxI)= p(∩i∈IχUi | ωxI)+ p(χMI | ωxI)− p(∩i∈IχUi ∩χMI | ωxI). (11)
Given that I = N , by the definition of idiosyncratic motives, we know that
∩i∈NχUi = ∅. Hence, p(∩i∈IχUi | ωxI) = p(∅) = 0.
Also, p(∩i∈NχUi ∩ χMI | ωxI) = p(∅ ∩ χMI | ωxI) = p(∅) = 0.
Consequently, Eq. (11) boils down to:
p(χUI ∪ χMI | ωxI) = p(χMI | ωxI). (12)
By properties COH and COM, finally, we have p(χUI ∪ χMI | ωxI) = 1 as in (6).
Hence, p(χMI | ωxI) = 1. unionsq
Proposition 1 makes the point that we can only say with certainty that an observ-
able outcome arises from moral motives in the hypothetical case in which there is a
consensus amongst all possible individuals in N who have ever existed and could ever
exist. In all other real-life cases, we will thus be dealing with uncertain and tentative
normative judgements.
4.2 Normative ranking of social choices
Wenow prove Proposition 2, which states that, given the properties and the PBR axiom
outlined in Sect. 3, the normative strength of an option will be directly dependent on
the number of individuals who are able to agree on its value.
Proposition 2 For all I, J ∈ Q\{N }, for x, y ∈ X and for a system of conditional
probabilities p(·) that satisfies properties ANO and IND, if the induced relation 
satisfies PBR and is binary, transitive and reflexive on observed choices ωxI , ω
x
J ∈ Z ,
then |I| > |J | ⇒ ωxI  ωxJ .
Proof For any I,J ∈ Q\ {N }, suppose |I| > |J | and let A ⊂ I such that |A| = |J |.
As p(·) satisfies properties ANO and IND, by Lemma 1, we already know that
A ⊂ I ⇒ p(χUI | ωxI) ≤ p(χUA | ωxA). (13)
Following PBR then we get p(χUI | ωxI) ≤ p(χUA | ωxA) ⇒ ωxI  ωxA.
If we can show that p(χUA | ωxA) = p(χUJ | ωxJ ), then that will complete our proof.
By property ANO, we already know that for all i, j ∈ N such that i = j ,
p(χUi | ωxi ) = p(χUj | ωxj ). (14)
Given that A,J ⊆ N , the relation in Eq. (14) holds for all i, j ∈ A as well as for
all i, j ∈ J .
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Note that we have assumed both |A| > 1 and |J | > 1. Then by property IND, we
obtain
p(χUJ | ωxJ ) =
∏
i∈J
p(χUi | ωxi ) (15)
and
p(χUA | ωxA) =
∏
i∈A
p(χUi | ωxi ). (16)
By our assumption of |A| = |J |, combining Eqs. (14), (15) and (16) we obtain,
p(χUA | ωxA) = p(χUJ | ωxJ ).
Then, by PBR (1b), we get p(χUA | ωxA) = p(χUJ | ωxJ ) ⇒ ωxA ∼ ωxJ .
Finally, since  is transitive over Z , it follows that ωxI  ω
x
A and ω
x
A ∼ ωxJ ⇒
ωxI  ω
x
J . unionsq
Proposition 2 captures Sen’s (2004) notion of normative validation through a pro-
cess of inter-rational testing, e.g. through public discussion or reasoned argument
(see also Popper 1980, p. 111). As such, it supports the intuitively appealing idea that
majority consensus carriesmore “normative” forcewhen themajority forming the con-
sensus is larger (e.g. the United States vs. Lichtenstein, or the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, vs. the European Convention on Human Rights). At the same time,
it recognises the limitations of such processes, highlighting the historically verified
fact that free democratic decisions do not by themselves guarantee outcomes (except
in the hypothetical case of a consensus involving an infinite number of preference
profiles following the result presented in Proposition 1).6
5 Conclusions
In a recent paper, Ravallion (2011) rightly criticised the weights used in multidimen-
sional indices for lacking the sort of theoretical justification that allows neoclassical
economists to claim that “market prices are defensible weights on quantities in
measuring national income” (Ravallion 2011, p. 3). However, as Sen (1987) has
argued repeatedly, the normative claims of neoclassical economics are contingent
on the acceptance of an essentially utilitarian normative standpoint and description
of human nature, which is far from uncontroversial. Furthermore, even if we accept
such premises, there are well-studied theoretical and normative shortcoming in the
classical model of the rational self-interested decision-maker (Sen 1977; Rubinstein
and Salant 2012, etc.).
6 One alternative interpretation of the results in this paper could be as follows: suppose an agent has a true
preference that is fixed across time but in every period there is an idiosyncratic shock (modelled as giving
rise to a new binary relation) that lead to choices that are “errors” with regards to the agent’s true preference.
The data constitutes this agent’s choices in different time periods. The result then states that the longer the
stretch of time where the agent chooses the same alternative from a fixed menu, the more likely it is to
reveal her true preferences.
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In this paper, we have tried to explore the possibility of relaxing some of the most
enduring assumptions of this model in order to make it more compatible with the non-
utilitarian description of human nature proposed by Sen. In particular, we have shown
that it is possible to develop a normative ranking that starts from the assumption of
pluralmotivations. Themodel focuses on the specific issue of non-utilitarian normative
rankings, and does not look into other criticisms that have been levied against the
standard choice model, regarding, for instance, incoherent choices (Hammond 1976),
temptation (Kopylov 2012), regret (Stoye 2011), etc. As such, it can be subjected to
many of the same critiques and variations as the standard model to explore real-world
deviations from this theoretical benchmark.
We believe that the findings presented in this paper have practical implications
for normative economic assessments, notably when using so-called multidimensional
poverty indices, since it provides a theoretical foundation that is currently lacking for
assigningweights in the construction of such indices. In particular, themodel presented
in this paper is compatible with a rights-based approach to determination of weights,
based, for instance, on normative frameworks, such as the international declaration of
human rights or other documents that have gone through a process of inter-rational
validation. Potentially, the findings of this paper, could also have applications in other
areas of normative economics, which currently rely, explicitly or implicitly, on the
axiom of revealed preference to assign normative value to social outcomes.
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